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The effect of globalization on the world's poor is a highly debated topic. Typically defined as the process by which different countries become more closely integrated, globalization has been portrayed both as a cause of poverty and as a solution to the same problem. Due to data limitations, research has thus far been unable to provide conclusive evidence on the relationship between globalization and absolute poverty, as measured by the population share living below one PPP dollar per day. Existing research either concludes that economic openness is likely to reduce poverty because it has been shown to increase growth (Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) , Dollar and Kraay (2004) ), or examines ex ante poverty using CGE-models (Ganuza et al., 2005) . There are also some cross-country studies focusing on actual poverty outcomes such as Heshmati (2007) , but the few existing panel data studies cover a very limited set of countries such as Agénor (2004) with N=16. 1 This paper examines how globalization is linked to changes in ex post absolute poverty in a way that is detailed enough to provide a basis for the ongoing policy discussion relating, for example, to the UN Millennium Development Goals with regard to poverty reduction. We find that globalization is on average followed by lower poverty; however, only a small part of the effect is mediated via the growth channel.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, recent improvements in data availability allow us to construct a panel dataset with better coverage than previous studies. Our regressions include more than 100 countries, with poverty data averaged over four five-year periods, the first one being 1988 to 1992.
Second, using the so-called KOF Index of Globalization, developed by and updated in , allows for an identification of the poverty effects of economic and social globalization separately. Moreover, for economic globalization, the index allows us to distinguish between trade flows and trade policies such as tariff rates. For social globalization, we separately analyze the poverty effects of information flows, personal contacts, and a measure of cultural proximity based on trade in books and the number of McDonald's restaurants and IKEA stores per capita.
Third, in addition to analyzing a panel with five-year averages, we also regress changes in globalization on subsequent changes in absolute poverty over a longer time period (12 years is the average duration in our sample), controlling for economic growth. This approach allows for an examination of how much of the effect of globalization on poverty is mediated by growth.
Fourth, by using interaction terms, we analyze if there are circumstances under which the relationship between globalization and poverty is particularly strong. For example, we examine if the association varies with level of democracy, country size of the informal sector and the quality of institutions. We also examine possible complementarities between economic and social globalization.
The results suggest a robust negative relationship between globalization and absolute poverty, which is consistent with the J-curve hypothesis, discussed by, for example, Agénor (2004) , where increased globalization associates with short-run transition costs that may increase poverty, while globalization decreases poverty in the long run. In particular, information flows and more liberal trade restrictions robustly relate to lower poverty. When controlling for economic growth, the magnitude of the effect of globalization on poverty decreases only marginally, suggesting that higher growth is not the main mechanism through which globalization reduces poverty, a finding in line with some recent evidence (see for example Verme (2010) , studying the development in Kazakhstan), but it is in stark contrast to standard references such as Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) .
The article proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the literature on the relationship between types of globalization and growth, and discusses potential problems related to the measurement of poverty. Section II provides an analytical framework discussing the possible links from globalization to absolute poverty. Section III describes our data and empirical strategy, and presents baseline panel regression results. Section IV analyzes the role of potential mechanisms mediating the globalizationpoverty relationship, while section V examines the long-run association. The article closes with some concluding remarks on the implications of the findings.
I. BACKGROUND

Views on the relationship between globalization and poverty
Most studies of how globalization affects poverty focus on economic globalization, in particular trade openness. The standard approach, illustrated in figure 1a, is to examine the effect on poverty by focusing on economic growth as a mediator, something Harrison and McMillan (2007) call "the orthodox view" (p. 124). A typical example is Dollar and Kraay (2004) , who argue that trade is good for growth, and that there is no systematic relationship between changes in trade volumes and changes in the income distribution. Thus, they conclude, if trade or some other measure of economic openness increases growth rates, this translates into proportionate increases in the income of the poor. 2
In the short run, however, globalization can affect absolute poverty regardless of its effect on growth. Growth occurs when average real income increases, but absolute poverty depends on how globalization affects the incomes of the poor. Theoretically, poverty may consequently decrease without growth or increase despite growth. The ambiguity of the relationship between growth and poverty reduction is not only a theoretical oddity: using data on 58 developing countries for the period 1980-1998, Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) find large regional variations in the capacity of growth to reduce absolute poverty. (The effect was found to be smallest in sub-Saharan Africa, and largest in the Middle East and North Africa region). Figure 1b presents an alternative, and to us preferred, view of the chain of mechanisms: globalization affects prices, incomes and information flows. Depending on how incomes, prices and behavior change, growth and/or poverty reduction may be the outcome. Our disapproval of the orthodox view is not new: Lundberg and Lyn (2003) argue that "the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes" (p. 326). And Bourguignon (2004) notes that changes in poverty depend on growth in two ways: the initial income distribution and the change in the income distribution caused by growth.
Conclusions on the effect of globalization on poverty relying only on the chain from globalization to growth to poverty reduction are problematic also in light of the literature linking globalization to inequality: If globalization causes both growth and higher income dispersion, the effect on poverty is ambiguous. In fact, Bergh and Nilsson (2010) , Milanovic and Squire (2006) , and Lundberg and Lyn (2003) find evidence that trade or economic globalization tends to increase inequality. Bergh and Nilsson, however, note that the inequality effect is driven by the relationship in rich and middle-income countries, while Milanovic and Squire report that higher trade volume increases income inequality in poor countries only.
While these seemingly conflicting results may all be explained by differences in samples and the measurements used, the varying results nicely illustrate an essential point. To infer how globalization affects poverty, it is not enough to assume a constant income distribution such that a positive relationship Globalization Growth Poverty Globalization Incomes, prices and information Growth Poverty 5 between globalization and growth automatically implies less poverty. Instead, we will examine levels and first differences on how globalization relates to subsequent poverty.
In defense of the standard approach, it is worth mentioning that in the long run it is highly unlikely that growth occurs without a reduction of absolute poverty. From a policy perspective, however, it is still interesting to gain knowledge on whether the long run translates to 5 or 15 years, or even longer.
Measuring poverty and globalization
Measuring poverty involves a number of potential problems. For recent overviews of the debate and methodological choices involved, see Anand et al. (2010) and Deaton (2010) .
First, the World Bank's poverty line set at one dollar (PPP adjusted) per day can be criticized for being too narrow. As the argument goes, poverty is a multidimensional concept that should not be reduced to a monetary measure of purchasing power.
Second, there is also a debate amongst those who accept the dollar-a-day measurement.
Fundamentally, there is no obvious best way to calculate measures of absolute purchasing power that are comparable across both time and space when relative prices vary over time and between countries.
Deaton (2010) Alternative estimates on mean income can be drawn from national accounts, but these tend to overestimate mean income, as tax revenues and corporate profits are included in GDP per capita.
Replying to critics, Ravallion (2010) argues that the practice of updating estimations and revising the poverty line when confronted with new data has led to fluctuations, but this should not lead one to question the methodology used: the World Bank estimates remain the best projections available for studying absolute poverty worldwide. Our preferred measure of absolute poverty is the headcount index calculated for a poverty line of one PPP dollar per day from the World Bank (2010) .
The question of how to best measure economic globalization or economic openness has also been subjected to intense discussions. One of the most used measures of economic openness is the index introduced by Sachs and Warner (1995) . This index, however, is binary and questions have been raised by, among others, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) with regard to what it actually measures. 3 An important point brought up by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) is the distinction between trade flows (such as imports and exports) and trade policies (such as tariffs, taxes and regulations). Studies finding that trade flows are 6 linked to growth are not sufficient to conclude that policies of economic openness lead to growth. More liberal trade restrictions need not necessarily lead to higher trade flows.
Globalization is, however, not only a question of economic openness. As discussed by Arribas et al. (2009) , internationalization presents many facets because of the various types of interactions it involves, many of which may potentially affect poverty. Our preferred measure of globalization is the socalled KOF Index developed by and updated in . The index quantifies economic, social and political globalization, using principal components analysis, to construct an aggregate index that is comparable over time and between countries. In addition to allowing for a separation between three dimensions of globalization, economic globalization can be further broken down into trade flows and trade policies, and social globalization into information flows, personal contact and cultural proximity. The index is updated every year and available on the web. Details can be found in table 1 and table A1 in the Appendix. For further information, see .
This examination particularly focuses on the relationship between economic and social globalization and poverty, but leaves out a separate analysis of the political dimension of globalization.
The indicators of political globalization are slightly hard to interpret, as there are no clear theoretical predictions as to how the indicators may affect poverty, and the problems of reverse causality may be severe. However, when using the aggregate index, political globalization is included. We do this in order to obtain results for globalization when measured the way intended by the creators of the KOF Index.
II. POSSIBLE LINKS FROM GLOBALIZATION TO POVERTY
Mainstream economic theory suggests several mechanisms through which economic openness may foster growth. Specialization, scale economies, competition, incentives for macro-economic stability, and innovation are all mechanisms likely to be important. More integration in the global economy may also increase the returns to higher education in poor countries, as described by Stark (2004) , with positive longrun growth effects through human capital. Many of these effects are likely to require some time to also affect poverty, and as discussed before the poverty effect may be counteracted by increases in the income dispersion. Agénor (2004) describes several reasons for expecting economic globalization to decrease poverty in the long run but notes that due to various types of short-run costs, the short-term effect may, however, be an increase in absolute poverty. Such reasons include:
• Transition costs: As an economy opens, more and cheaper capital becomes available. When firms replace labor with capital in production, poverty may increase before laid-off workers find new employment. Increased competition following economic openness may also affect unemployment by forcing some domestic firms out of business.
• Shortage of human capital: If openness leads to the introduction of more advanced technologies, or more capital intense production, the full benefits may require more skilled labor than is initially available.
7
• Better possibilities to work abroad are likely to increase the education premium, and as Stark (2004) describes, this likely affects the domestic stock of human capital but the mechanism is likely to work slowly.
• As discussed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (2002) , higher economic openness likely comes with a greater commitment to low inflation, which should foster growth in the long run and particularly assist the poor if they are vulnerable to inflation. The transition from high to low inflation may, however, be associated with higher unemployment in the short run.
• Globalization might affect government size and, for example, social spending, in turn affecting poverty. Two opposite mechanisms have been suggested: the race to the bottom hypothesis (Sinn, 1997) , where open economies compete by lowering taxes for example, and the compensation hypothesis suggested by Rodrik (1998) and Lindbeck (1975) , where open economies develop larger welfare states as an insurance institution.
In the presence of transition costs and the various time lags of the expected beneficial effects, there are strong reasons to expect an increase in globalization to have an inverted J-curve effect on absolute poverty.
Not all mechanisms suggest that economic globalization leads to lower poverty, even in the long run. For example, Kawachi and Wamala (2007) suggest that openness can lead to a faster and geographically broader spread of infectious diseases (such as HIV and the H5N1 avian influenza virus), which may increase poverty through lower productivity and labor supply. This adverse effect may well hit the poor relatively more, and thus serves as an example why openness may promote growth without decreasing poverty.
The KOF Index divides social globalization into information flows, personal contacts and cultural proximity, which are all likely to affect the functioning of markets, as well as the behavior of buyers and sellers on the market. In general, the functioning of markets is critically dependent on information flows. In less developed countries with high transaction costs and potentially large information asymmetries, there is a large potential gain in market efficiency from increased use of information and communications technologies (ICT). Both telecommunications and the Internet are powerful tools for information transfer and improve the functioning of markets in general. 4 As noted by Aker and Mbiti (2010) , the distribution of these efficiency gains among consumers, producers and firms is theoretically ambiguous. Lower search costs could benefit sellers in the short term if they make better use of spatial arbitrage opportunities, but as markets become more competitive, benefits will shift towards consumers as markets approach the law of one price (Aker and Mbiti, p. 216) . There are also studies showing that rural telephony increases the prices farmers receive for their crops and the earnings from off-farm activities (e.g., Duncombe (1999) and Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) ). Empirical evidence also suggests that telephone services can improve 8 government services such as health care (ITU, 1998) . Forestier et al. (2002) summarize a wide array of research on the effects of ICT on growth and inequality, and show that ICT in general is positively related to growth, but the effect on inequality is less clear. For any new information and communication technology, inequality is likely to increase in the short run, when only a small elite may access the technology. As more people get access, inequality falls. This reasoning applies to telephony, mobile phones and Internet access.
In general, information decreases transaction costs resulting in markets approaching the competitive equilibrium. Because transaction costs essentially work as a tax wedge, the effect of lowering such costs can be illustrated as shown in figure 2 . When transaction costs are present, transactions between buyers and sellers will only take place if the difference between producers' reservation price and consumers' willingness to pay exceeds the transaction cost. In the figure, lowering transaction costs from t0 to t1 decreases the minimum difference between consumers' willingness to pay and producers' reservation price necessary for transactions to take place. Just like taxes, the burden of high transaction costs is shared between producers and consumers, and lowering transaction costs will increase output.
FIGURE 2: The welfare effect of lower transaction costs
In addition to information flows, social globalization comprises cross-border personal contacts. Outgoing telephone traffic likely affects economic outcomes through the transmission of information and knowledge, similar to many indicators of information flows. Other types of personal contacts such as tourism have less obvious consequences. Chao et al. (2004) note that tourism is good for development through terms of trade effect and resource flows; however, possible negative externalities of mass tourism might offset these effects. As noted by Kondoh (1999) , there is an important difference between tourism something that is not only a proxy for economic globalization. 7 There may also be complementarities in globalization such that the effect of social globalization on poverty is bigger when economic globalization is high, or vice versa.
Following the above discussion, table 1 summarizes our measures of globalization and their expected effects on poverty. Few of the possible links between dimensions of globalization and absolute poverty are theoretically unambiguous, a situation that calls for empirical examination.
5 Links between tourism, trade and growth have also been recently investigated by Katircioglu (2009) for the case of Cyprus. 6 The term does, however, however not refer to the spread of McDonald's restaurants, but rather to -the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society, as well as the rest of the world.‖ (Ritzer, 1996:293) 7 Views differ as to whether to include the various dimensions of globalization simultaneously or not. Heckelman and Stroup (2005) argue that any summary index may result in a misspecification bias, and suggest also performing the analysis using the actual individual components. , however, argue that components of globalization should be regressed in the same specification, as the different components are highly correlated, to control for other globalization dimensions. 
Short-run effects on
Prices and wages via changes in supply and demand.
Available information. Supply and demand.
Possible longrun effects on
Growth and innovation, human capital (Stark, 2004) .
Social norms and lifestyle (Medez and Popkin (2004) , Yach et al. (2007)).
Expected effect on absolute poverty
Ambiguous in the short run, negative in the long run.
Ambiguous both in the short and long run.
III. DATA, EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND BASELINE RESULTS
Our dataset covers the 1988-2007 period, with data averaged over four five-year periods: 1988-1992, 1993-1997, 1998-2002, and 2003-2007 . The panel is unbalanced but includes information for more than 100 countries, and the efficient sample consists of close to 300 observations meeting baseline
specifications. An absolute majority of these observations refers to conditions in countries classified as low-or lower-middle-income countries with a 2008 GNI per capita of USD 3,855 or less. Table A2 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics and sources for all variables used in the analysis, and table A3 in the Appendix presents details about the country sample.
The main dependent variable is the headcount index, defined as the percentage of the population in a particular country living on less than one dollar per day (PPP adjusted 1993) . This measure comes from the Povcal database (World Bank, 2010) and is derived from household surveys. 8 In the sensitivity analysis, we also use the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap, which account for the distribution of the poor as alternative dependent variables (taken from the same source). 9
Our globalization measure is the KOF Index , as described in section I. We use the index both as a composite measure (KOF), in which the three dimensions of globalization are equally weighted together, and in a disaggregated format (KOF1 and KOF2). Moreover, we use the subcomponents for the economic and the social globalization index (flows and restrictions, and information flows, personal contact and cultural proximity, respectively). The index takes values between 0 and 100 with higher values indicating more globalization.
Because we expect an increase in globalization to have an inverted J-curve effect on poverty, we would ideally want to estimate a dynamic model that allows us to explore in detail the shape of such a Jcurve. Lack of data prevents us from using such models, but other methodological possibilities remain.
One is to estimate the relationship in first differences during a period sufficiently long so that the effects of globalization are likely to be dominated by the long-run (poverty-decreasing) effects. We do this in section IV. Another possibility is to estimate a panel with globalization and poverty observed at regular intervals, allowing for non-linear effects to account for the inverted J-curve relation. A graphical explanation is given in figure 3 , which illustrates the expected effect of a positive shock to globalization occurring at time t. If the inverted J-curve hypothesis is correct, and the interval is sufficiently long, we observe decreased poverty at t+1.
Curve A illustrates a small positive globalization shock at time t. If a larger shock to globalization leads to larger transition costs, but also to greater long-run benefits, the inverted J-curve will look like curve B, in which case poverty at t+1 will be higher, despite eventually becoming lower. 8 There is a large discrepancy between national accounts and survey data estimates of consumption. A major source of controversy among researchers in the field relates to the question of what source of information should be used to accurately measure the level and change of poverty. For a thorough review of the advantages and limitations of survey-based measures, see Deaton (2001) . 9 In all but four cases-India, China, Indonesia, and Argentina-information on poverty outcomes refers to a national level. For these countries, we instead make use of poverty estimates referring to rural and urban areas. Our result and conclusions do not change when excluding these particular observations from the analysis. As shown in figure 3, if the observations are sufficiently far apart in time, we expect bigger increases in globalization to lead to larger decreases in poverty, and a linear model will do. However, if poverty observations occur at t and t+1 as shown in the figure, we will actually observe higher poverty at t+1 for the larger globalization shock (curve B) compared to the smaller shock (curve A). In this case, the empirical patterns consistent with the inverted J-curve theory will be a negative coefficient on the linear term and a positive coefficient on the squared term in a regression of poverty on globalization with time and country-fixed effects and poverty observed five years after globalization. In a first difference regression using the longest durations available in the data, we expect a negative relation between changes in globalization and changes in poverty (assuming that the period is long enough for the long-run effect to dominate). Needless to say, the long-run, poverty-decreasing effects from globalization may be small and/or take more than 15 years to materialize, in which case we will find that globalization increases poverty, or that globalization does not matter at all.
We first formulate the following empirical model, where countries are represented by i and time by t:
In equation (1), Glob is a vector for different types of globalization, and because the impact of globalization on poverty is unlikely to be instant, these variables are lagged. For example, average globalization in 1983-1987 is used to explain average poverty in 1988-1992. 10 X is a vector that includes the additional covariates presented above, which are either classified as potential mediators through which globalization influences poverty or as exogenous factors affecting poverty 10 Lagging globalization also reduces the bias following from potentially reverse causality between globalization and poverty. One reason for expecting a reverse causality is that donor programs targeting poor countries have recently often recommended economic openness as a main policy. that the aggregate index includes political globalization that we do not analyze separately. 13 Results for the different types of globalization (columns 3 to 6) suggest that the poverty-decreasing effect holds for both economic and social globalization. As expected, the size of the association decreases when controlling for income, but only marginally. This suggests that globalization tends to decrease poverty, but not mainly via the income channel-at least in the short run captured by our panel.
Examining what indicators of economic and social globalization drive the negative association with poverty in table 3 gives some clear and interesting results. Including trade flows and trade restrictions separately and together (column 1 to 6) suggests that the significant coefficient on economic globalization comes from restrictions rather than from flows. 14 A similar exercise for social globalization (columns 7 to 14) points to the importance of information flows for decreasing poverty, while cultural proximity actually seems to have a small poverty-increasing effect when all components of social globalization are included simultaneously. While an expected negative effect of education on poverty is uncontroversial, there are different views on the poverty consequences of urbanization. As noted by Leon (2008) , the positive and progressive aspects of cities often recognized by historians and economists contrast with the more pessimistic tone of the epidemiological and public health literature, which according to Leon can be traced back to Snow (1855) , who described the effects of cholera spreading in London during the 1840s. The newer, more optimistic view is summarized by Whiting and Unwin (2009) With regard to government consumption, there are several reasons to expect that states with larger welfare systems have lower poverty rates, but higher government expenditure does not necessarily imply a larger welfare state. For example, many developing countries allocate relatively large shares of public expenditures to defense activities, and as shown by Mosley and Suleiman (2007) such expenditures seem to hurt, not support, the poor. Inflation is generally assumed to be harmful to the poor, whose assets are typically less protected against inflation. Unanticipated inflation may also lead to resource misallocation in an attempt to mitigate the uncertainty of future price levels, in turn prohibiting possibilities of progressive redistribution, as described by Fischer and Modigliani (1978) . coefficients by much at all, suggesting that government size is not an important mechanism for poverty reduction.
Urbanization, on the other hand, turns out to be negatively related to poverty, supporting the newer rather than the older view as described earlier, but the variable inclusion does not change the globalization coefficients. Perhaps more surprisingly, education seems to be unrelated to poverty.
Inflation, interestingly, turns out to associate with less poverty. This unexpected result may in part be explained by the fact that many poor consume self-grown crops and also sell part of the crops at market prices. In this way, they are protected against the adverse effects of inflation. Finally, including all the above control variables in the same specification changes little except for small reductions in the size of the globalization coefficients.
Finally, we examine if the relationship between globalization and poverty depends on the level of democracy using the Polity IV index by Marshall and Jaggers (2009) , which ranges from 10 to 10 with higher values indicating more democratic regimes. 17 Including only observations with a Polity IV score of at least 7 in the regression (there are 115 such observations from 50 countries, with an average Polity IV score of 8.26), results in a slightly larger coefficient on the aggregated globalization index, and also marks social globalization insignificant. The insignificance of social globalization masks, however, a negative effect of information flows and a positive effect of cultural proximity, similarly to the full sample. For economic globalization, the effect seems driven by restrictions, again similarly to the full sample.
Running a separate regression on the remaining 186 observations (coming from 82 countries with an average Polity IV score of 2.76) reveals that the negative coefficient on economic globalization in less democratic countries is driven by trade flows rather than restrictions, contrary to the results using the full sample. TABLE 5 . Exploring the mechanisms from globalization to poverty reduction, cont. Sindzingre (2005) suggests variability in the impact of globalization on poverty outcomes may stem from discontinuities and particularly emphasize institutions as a critical factor for the impact of globalization on the poor. Following this argument, it seems relevant to analyze if there are circumstances when the relationship of interest is particularly strong. Table 6 presents results for estimations, including interaction terms between dimensions of globalization and various factors. While the globalization-poverty association does not significantly vary with the quality of institutions or level of democracy, globalization seems particularly poverty reducing in countries with a large informal sector. Results further suggest that globalization is beneficial for the rural poor. We also examine possible complementarities between economic and social globalization but do not find any significant interaction effect. To further check the robustness of our baseline findings using panel regressions, table A4 in the Appendix presents the results from the following sensitivity tests: changing the specification to a random effects model, using globalization in period t rather than t-1, excluding observations with extreme values of globalization and poverty, using alternative measures of poverty, and excluding various geographical regions. Overall baseline results are very robust to various changes, suggesting that globalization is good for the poor. In particular, more liberal trade restrictions and larger information flows correlate with less absolute poverty.
V. THE LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND POVERTY
As an alternative to the panel specification, we study the development of globalization and poverty by considering the difference over a longer time period, running the following regression:
In equation (2), i Poverty  refers to the difference in poverty in country i over a certain time period.
This specification maximizes the possibility of capturing mechanisms that decrease poverty in the long run by increasing growth. Following Ravallion (2006) , we maximize the length of this time period for each country, and the dependent variable might consequently correspond to changes in poverty over different periods for different countries. To separate this analysis from the panel examination, we only include changes that take place over 10 to 15 years, excluding countries for which we only have information on poverty in two adjacent time periods. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 %, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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VI. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
We set out to test the links and mechanisms from globalization to poverty reduction. Our results are coherent enough to identify some interesting patterns. First, there is no evidence that globalization is associated with higher poverty levels in developing countries. While we cannot identify causal effects, the relationship between the lagged aggregate KOF Index of globalization and poverty is always negative and significant in almost all regressions. To describe the size of the effect, consider the case of Bangladesh.
Between 1980 and 2000, the country increased its KOF value from 8 to 30. According to our estimates, this translates to a reduction of absolute poverty by 12 percentage points. The size of the effect is not at all remarkable, as it roughly means that it takes a two standard deviation increase in globalization to decrease poverty by half a standard deviation. Note, however, that the effect is in addition to the decrease explained by GDP growth.
Looking closer at the factors included in the index, less trade restrictions and larger information flows are robustly associated with lower poverty levels. Our results also indicate that globalization decreases poverty more when the informal and the rural sectors are relatively bigger. Finally, we find clear evidence that the main part of the poverty-decreasing effect is not mediated via the growth channel.
Analyzing trade flows only, the standard approach (assuming that trade increases growth and growth decreases poverty) holds up well. In both the short-run and long-run analysis, we find that higher trade flows are on average followed by lower poverty, but the effect is no longer significant once we control for income or growth. However, the fact that trade restrictions turn out to be more robust than trade flows should probably be carefully interpreted: Deaton (1995) notes that trade data may be biased upwards due to over-invoicing of imports, a method often used to transfer funds abroad from lowincome countries, causing a systematic bias in trade data and in national accounts.
For both trade restrictions and information flows, a relatively large poverty-decreasing effect remains after controlling for GDP per capita, suggesting that the standard approach actually underestimates the poverty-reducing impact of globalization. How can the result that globalization decreases poverty but not via growth be explained?
A possible explanation is that there are income distribution effects such that the incomes of the poor increase more than the average income. Another possibility is that the result is caused by measurement errors in the GDP data. As discussed by Heston (1994) , productivity increases in the subsistence sector and the informal sector, which are often insufficiently captured in GDP data. Because these sectors are typically bigger when the rural sector is larger, this explanation is supported by the interaction effects, which suggest that globalization reduces poverty more when the informal and rural 24 sectors are larger. These results should therefore be carefully interpreted and may simply indicate that less actual growth is captured by GDP data in countries with bigger rural and informal sectors. 18 Despite these concerns about data quality and measurement problems, we still believe our results leave room for cautious optimism. The rapid increase in usage of mobile phones and the Internet is most likely not a statistical artifact caused by measurement problems. As noted by Aker and Mbiti (2010) , there has been a massive increase in mobile phone use subscribers in sub-Saharan Africa during the past decade, and according to our estimates this should make it easier for these countries to meet the first UN Millennium Development Goals of cutting the proportion of people living on less than one dollar a day by 2015 in half. Moreover, although the fact that many low-income countries embarked on programs of external economic liberalization in recent decades has been intensely debated, our analysis suggests that the underlying premises of current and previous poverty reduction strategies are correct: poverty reduction can be achieved by means of closer economic integration and higher levels of globalization.
25 APPENDIX 19 Explanatory note: For each dimension of globalization and related sub-components, we run four regressions to test the robustness of our baseline findings on the long-run relationship between globalization and poverty. First, we exclude observations with extreme values of changes in poverty defined as countries with at least a change in poverty over the period further than two standard deviations away from the sample mean. Second, we exclude extreme values of changes in globalization according to the same rule. Finally, we sequentially control for geographical regions. With regard to social globalization, there are no observations classified as extreme values resulting in three rather than four sensitivity regressions.
